The Death of Alfonso Cano is not the death of the FARC.

November 4^th the Colombian army killed the head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Even if this has been a severe blow for the guerrilleros, they do not seem to be opening up for a peaceful agreement.

Source: PressTV

The death of Alfonso Cano during a military action early in the morning on November 4^th, in the department of Cauca, is the toughest hit endured till now by the FARC; also because it happens right after the disappearance of two other leaders: Raul Reyes in March 2008 and Mono Jojoy in September 2010. Cano is the fourth component of the summit of the FARC to be killed in a military operation and the fifth if one counts that the legendary chief of the guerrilla Manuel Marilanda Velez, also known as Tirofijo, died of an apparently natural death in 2008. Today, of the seven men that in the 90’s obtained quite a few successes there are only two left: Timoleon Jimenez, nicknamed Timochenko, and Ivan Marquez.

The leadership of the FARC, as all Stalinist-inspired organizations, acts as a military council with a visible leader but with a collective, real, not purely representative, management. Its ability to substitute dead leaders, though, is failing, and not only for the disappearance of the men that have marked the history of the group in the last decades, but also because the gerrilleros with a national importance are always less.

Source: Blitz Quotidiano

Pessimism

The blow suffered by the FARC is severe also from a military point of view. Alfonso Cano was the promoter of a new strategy of resistance to the Colombian army that was having quite some success. The continuous wave of attacks typical of the guerrilla, with the use of snipers and the launch of bombs in some departments of the country, the placement of landmines car bombs in the cities and, more recently, the organization of some fortunate ambushes against the army, had raised concern about the possible resumption of the FARC. The strategy of Cano had given a certain breathing space to the guerrilla.

It is therefore probable that, at least for some time, his death will strengthen the uncertainty and disorient the chain of command. Without counting the severe blow that the disappearance of FARC’s leader represents for the spirit of the group, every month it has to deal with hundreds of demobilized.

The death of Cano underlines also the strategic defeat of the organization, but it does not mean the end of the guerrilla nor the approach to a peaceful resolution. Most probably, for some time at least, the Revolutionary Army will take care of healing its wounds: the changes in the summit, the concern for the safety of the survived leaders and the preoccupation for the air supremacy demonstrated by the government, will bring to a greater isolation. At least in the short run it is unlikely that the new leadership will give any signs of rapprochement to the government, an act that inside the group would be interpreted as a defeat.

Despite the very little triumphalistic tone with which the president Juan Manuel Santos has announced the death of Cano, his message to the guerrillas has been clear. Santos has made it clear to them that the only way to avoid death or a life in prison is the demobilization and the opening up to negotiations. A message that very probably this old peasant guerrilla, transformed into a “war machine”, (as written by Eduardo Pizarro, one of the major experts of the FARC) will interpret as a provocation.

One can make many hypotheses about the possible scenarios that will open up after the disappearance of this great leader Alfonso: the guerrillas could sit on the table of the negotiations, join the drug traffic and the other many discussible actions of the new paramilitary groups, or disintegrate in small groups that, in some cases, already have some alliances with the successors of the paramilitary in charge of operating and administrating the traffic of cocaine. Finally, they could create new fronts more faithful to the tradition of the guerrilla.

For now it is impossible to say with certainty which way the Revolutionary Army will take: their history, their logic and the changes that they have suffered in the last years do not leave hope for anything good. Certainly the organization will not give up easily.

Maybe the constant succession of setbacks and losses, the last worst than the previous ones, will change the situation.